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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
VICTORY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE
Since the adoption by the electorate in 1912 of article XVIII of
the Ohio Constitution, the purpose of which in the minds of its fram-
ers was to emancipate municipal corporations from legislative bond-
age,' home rule has had an uncertain and uneven road at the hands of
the Ohio courts. In the past few years, however, there have been
heartening improvements in the patient's condition. A significant
rally took place in State ex rel. Leach v. Redick.2 In this case the
supreme court held that the City of Columbus was not bound to fol-
low the provisions of sections 721.01 and 721.03 of the Ohio Revised
Code with respect to the procedures required in the lease or sale of
municipally owned real estate.
The big leap forward resulted from the holding that the proce-
dure outlined by the legislature is an unconstitutional invasion of the
powers of local self-government conferred on municipal corporations
by article XVIII, section 3. An earlier case 3 seems to have estab-
lished that the power of sale itself was one of the powers of local
self-government, thus knocking out section 721.01. But it was not a
dear-cut holding that in exercising the power, a municipality was not
bound to follow the procedure set out in section 721.03. In Hugger
v. City of Ironton4 the court of appeals had held this attempt to pre-
scribe procedure to be without justification, but, unfortunately, the
appeal from that decision was dismissed.5 Thus was lost an oppor-
tunity to decide with finality a question of importance to municipal
attorneys and to title companies, as well as to the student of munici-
pal law. In the Redick case the supreme court adopted the wording
of the court of appeals in the Hugger case.
POLICE AND FIRE PENSIONS
A subject closely related to the field of municipal corporations is
that of municipal police and firemen's relief and pension funds. All
municipalities with two or more "full time regular members" in such
respective departments are required to maintain such funds,6 and it
has been held by the supreme court that the state statutes prevail over
municipal charter provisions in this respect.7 Even if this ruling
1. ELLiS, OHIo MUNICIPAL CODE, Text § 1.1 (10th ed. 1955).
2. 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
3. Babin v. City of Ashland, 160 Ohio St 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
4. 83 Ohio App. 21, 82 N.E.2d 118 (1947).
5. 148 Ohio St. 670, 76 N.E.2d 397 (1947).
6. Omo REV. CODE ch. 741.
7. Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941). There is a question
whether the holding in this case has not been considerably weakened by State ex rel. Lynch v.
City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 NXE.2d 118 (1956), and further destroyed by State
ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
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should in the future be reversed, the case of State ex rel. Bailey v.
Board of Trustees of Toledo Police Relief and Pension Fund8 pro-
vides a guide to the solution of a problem with respect to the man-
agement of such funds.
A member of the city police force resigned in 1942, after almost
eighteen years of actual service, to enter the armed services. He was
entitled to, applied for, and received a pension during the time he
was in military service.9 When he received his honorable discharge
from military service, he applied for, and was reappointed to the po-
lice department ° and served until 1957, when he again retired with
a total of over thirty-two years of service.
The questions were (1) whether the patrolman could claim credit
toward his new retirement pension for the period while he was pre-
viously on pension during military service, and (2) if he could,
whether he must return to the fund the total drawn by him during
that time. The supreme court held that in computing his total ser-
vice for his new pension, relator was entitled to count the time during
which he was in military service and drawing his first pension, but
that he must repay to the fund the amount which he had received by
way of pension during military service. Despite relator's contention
that Ohio Revised Code section 741.47" allowed him to keep the
moneys he had previously received, the court analogized the situation
to that of a member of the department who, having resigned, with-
drew from the pension fund his accumulated contributions, entered
military service, and was thereafter reinstated in the department.
Under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 741.49, such a
person would be required to restore to the fund the amounts received
from it by him. The court felt that to rule otherwise with respect to
relator would be to give him an unjustly favorable position.
TORT LIABILITY
There were several decisions in the area of municipal tort liability
during the period covered by this Survey. In Crisafi v. City of Cleve-
land,'" recovery was sought against the municipality for injuries to
property alleged to have been caused by subterranean tremors result-
ing from dynamiting and blasting in a nearby municipal park and zoo.
Plaintiff contended that liability was imposed by Ohio Revised Code
section 723.01, enjoining upon municipal corporations the duty of
8. 169 Ohio St. 1, 157 N.E.2d 317 (1959). See also discussion in Administrative Law and
Procedure section, p. 338 supra.
9. OHio REv. CODE 5 741.49(E) (Supp. 1959).
10. OHIo REV. CODE § 143.22, 741.48 (Supp. 1959).
11. "Sums of money due or to become due to any pensioner shall not be liable to attachment,
levy, or seizure under any legal or equitable process . but shall inure wholly to the benefit
of such pensioner."
12. 169 Ohio St. 137, 158 N.E.2d 379 (1959).
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keeping their public grounds free from nuisance, and he relied upon
certain cases holding that the use of dynamite is an absolute nuis-
ance, 3 making a city liable for its use.14
The supreme court, as a matter of law, found there was no munic-
ipal liability. The court stated that a city is liable for damage re-
sulting from the creation of a nuisance where the city is acting in a
proprietary capacity. But the court held that no such liability will
attach, in the absence of statute, where the municipality is engaged
in the performance of an act in its governmental capacity, in which
capacity the court classified the improvement of a park and zoo. Sec-
tion 723.01 was held to impose the duty upon municipalities only with
respect to keeping such grounds free from nuisance as to persons
traveling therein or using the same, which plaintiff was not doing
here. Further, the damage to plaintiff's property was held not to
constitute a pro tanto appropriation.' 5
In Eversole v. City of Columbus,'" the city was held not to be im-
mune from liability to a plaintiff who enrolled as a student in an arts
and crafts course, organized as a part of the city's recreational pro-
gram. Plaintiff paid a fee of $1.50, entered a "closet" in the build-
ing at the direction of the school director, and fell down an unlighted
and unguarded stairway. Conceding that ". . . the attempt to dis-
tinguish between governmental and ministerial or proprietary func-
tions in determining the liability of a municipal corporation is arti-
ficial and unrealistic, and that [there is sentiment that] such distinc-
tion should be abolished,' 7 the court reviewed various attempts to
distinguish where and how the line should be drawn, acknowledged
that "it is impossible to reconcile all the decisions of this court deal-
ing with the subject of governmental and proprietary functions" (cit-
ing numerous examples), and ruled that in this case the city, "in vol-
untarily establishing and maintaining an arts and crafts center pri-
marily for the benefit and accommodation of those of its inhabitants
who might be interested was not exercising the functions of sover-
eignty and was engaged in a proprietary venture which made it
amenable to tort liability."-'
ZONING MATTERS
Within the broad framework of the constitutionality, in general,
of zoning regulations, there still remain many questions in specific
13. Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 144, 54 N.E. 528
(1899).
14. Louden v. Cindnnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970 (1914).
15. For a more complete discussion of the Crisafi case, see 11 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 319
(1960).
16. 169 Ohio St. 205, 158 NX.E.2d 515 (1959).
17. Id. at 207, 158 NB.2d at 517.
18. Id. at 208, 158 N.E.2d at 518.
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instances. The infinite variety of phraseology which is to be found
in comparing the ordinances of one city to those of another, and the
fact that every parcel of land on the face of the earth is unique and
is entitled to be considered as such in the face of general efforts to
control its use, make it difficult to lay down broad rules for determin-
ing the validity of zoning ordinances.
During the period covered by this Survey, there appeared a de-
cision which seems for the first time, in Ohio, to have upheld the pro-
hibition of the use of land zoned for residential purposes as a means
of access to a lawfully operating use of a lower zoning classifica-
tion.' 9 Noting that ingress and egress were available to a shopping
center over land zoned for commercial use, the court distinguished an
earlier case20 in which there was an absolute absence of any access to
the street, and enjoined the use of a lot in a residential area for egress
and ingress to a shopping center.
In Freight, Inc. v. Board of Township Trustees,21 the Court of
Appeals for Summit County had before it the question of whether an
Ohio corporation engaged in the intrastate and interstate transporta-
tion, by motor vehicle, of chattels, general commodities, and other
property, with the necessary authority of the ICC and of the pub-
lic utilities commissions of Ohio and other states, was a public utility
within the scope of Ohio Revised Code section 519.21. The statu-
tory authority for zoning in townships (as distinguished from muni-
cipal corporations) is limited, and this particular section forbids
township zoning regulations to restrict or regulate the location, erec-
tion, construction, or use of land owned or used by any public utility
or railroad.
The court held the plaintiff to be a public utility, and, therefore,
exempt from zoning regulation. The result, inescapable under the
statute, points out one advantage of incorporation over the township
form of government, and the possibility of the need for a change in
the township zoning statutes.
POLICE POWER
A most significant decision in the area of the exercise of munici-
pal police power was made in the case of State ex rel. Cleveland Elec-
tric Illuminating Company v. City of Euclid.22 On the one hand, it
is a strengthening of the power of municipal corporations to regulate
the erection and construction of public utility electric transmission
lines. On the other hand, the result will probably be to increase con-
siderably the cost of electric current to consumers thereof.
The City of Euclid adopted an ordinance requiring electric power
19. Windsor v. Lane Dev. Co., 158 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
20. Northern Boiler Co. v. David, 157 Ohio St. 564, 106 N.E.2d 620 (1952).
21. 158 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), motion to certify denied, Dec. 10, 1958.
22. 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959).
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companies to place underground their wires carrying in excess of
33,000 volts. The relator-utility company, doing business in the city
under a franchise dating back to 1906, contended that the require-
ment of the ordinance was unreasonable, unrelated to the health,
safety, and welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and, there-
fore, unconstitutional. A special master appointed by the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals, in which court the original mandamus ac-
tion to compel the issuance of a construction permit had been brought,
found the ordinance unconstitutional and the court of appeals adopted
his recommendation. 3
By a 4 to 3 vote, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals
and upheld the city's contentions. The supreme court relied upon
three separate sections of the Ohio Revised Code,24 which authorize
"reasonable regulation" of such facilities by the city and require the
consent of the municipal council for their erection. The court took
judicial notice of the inherently dangerous character of high-voltage
electricity and pointed out that even with the modern safety devices
which attempt to protect against accidental harm from such installa-
tions, there exist "dangerous propensities."
A motion for rehearing of the case was subsequently overruled
2 5
A "Green River" peddler's and hawker's licensing ordinance of
the City of Defiance was before the Court of Appeals for Defiance
County in City of Defiance v. Nagle .2  The gist of such ordinances
is a provision thereof which declares the "practice" of going in and
upon private residences by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, and itinerant
vendors of merchandise, not having been invited to do so by the
owner or occupant, to solicit orders for, or to peddle goods, wares,
and merchandise, to be a nuisance punishable as a misdemeanor.
The defendant in this case, a route man for a bakery which sold
much of its products from its wagons by door-to-door solicitation of
regular customers, had the misfortune of attempting to secure the
patronage of the wife of the chief of police. That law-abiding lady
promptly did him in.
The court of appeals reversed a conviction under the ordinance.
They did so on the specific ground that the forbidden "practice" was
not shown by the commission of a single act of solicitation. In dictum
they adverted to the provision of Ohio Revised Code section 715.63,
which provides in part that "no municipal corporation may require
of the owner of any product of his own raising, or the manufacturer
of any article manufactured by him, a license to vend or sell, by him-
23. State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Euclid, No. 24263, Ohio Ct. App.,
Nov. 19, 1958.
24. Omo REv. CODE §§ 715.27, 4933.13, 4933.16.
25. State ex rel Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Euclid, 170 Ohio St. 45, 162
N.E.2d 125 (1959). See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 359 supra.
26. 108 Ohio App. 119, 159 N.B.2d 791 (1959).
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self or his agent, any such article or product." Since defendant was
discharged on the ground previously mentioned, this argument need
not have been mentioned at all, as one judge pointed out in a separate
opinion" in which he raised the very pertinent question of whether
section 715.63 is not itself in conflict with article XVIII, section 3 of
the state constitution. No mention was made of the earlier case of
Frecker v. City of Dayton. In that case, the court struck down the
attempt of the City of Dayton, by ordinance, to prevent the sale in
parks and on streets and sidewalks of such items as ice cream, candy,
and soft drinks. The court reasoned that Ohio General Code section
3670 (now Ohio Revised Code section 715.61) authorized cities to
regulate, which thereby excluded the power to forbid. The Frecker
case probably ought to be re-examined in the light of the decision in
the Nagle case, when the opportunity to do so is afforded.
HOME RULE - POWER TO CREATE OFFENSES
The City of Cleveland had an ordinance defining and providing
the punishment for the offense of carrying concealed weapons. It
was substantially like the state statute."9 The principal difference
between the two was that the city ordinance provided for punishment
upon conviction by a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $500,
and imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than six
months. The statute permits treatment of the offense as either a
felony or a misdemeanor, by providing for a penalty of not more than
$500 fine, or imprisonment in the workhouse for not less than thirty
days nor more than six months, or imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not less than one year nor more than three years.
Defendant was charged, convicted, and sentenced under the city
ordinance and appealed." The city relied upon section 3, article
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. 31
Defendant relied upon section 10, article I of the Ohio Constitu-
tion32 and Ohio Revised Code section 1.0633
The supreme court held that since penitentiary imprisonment may
be imposed for violation of the statute, the offense is a felony, and
27. Id. at 123, 159 N.E.2d at 794 (separate opinion).
28. 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), afid, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851
(1950).
29. Omo REv. CODE § 2923.01.
30. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). See also discus-
sion in Criminal Law section, p. 368 supra.
31. "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and
to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regula-
tions, as are not in conflict with general laws."
32. "Except in cases ... involving offenses for which the penalty provided is less than im-
prisonment in the penitentiary, no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury...."
33. "Offenses which may be punished by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary are
felonies; all other offenses are misdemeanors ....
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